A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France). 
Introduction
In local public-good games played on networks, actions are assumed to be strategic substitutes. 1 . However, one aspect that eluded the attention of this literature is the nature of network links. In this paper, we focus on directed links.
2
Our investigation was motivated by efforts to conserve wetlands. We chose to model the effort to conserve wetlands as a means of investigating directed network links. Stakeholders (e.g. cities) choose the amount of effort that they are willing to expend on conserving wetlands. However, the results cannot be taken in isolation because there are often directed flows of hydrological influence that link cities together. When a city makes an effort to conserve wetlands, areas that are downstream of the water flow benefit. Herein, a model of common-pool resource (CPR) conservation in a natural directed network is constructed. We examine the incentive to conserve a CPR that is non-excludable 3 along natural one-sided links. 1 See Jackson (forthcoming) for an overview of social networks and economic applications, with respect to (a) how they influence social and economic activity, and (b) how they can be modeled and analyzed. 2 Directed networks have been essentially analyzed in network formation games. For instance, Bala and Goyal (2000) model the network formation process as a noncooperative game and study both directed links and undirected links. Dutta and Jackson (2000) explore the question of endogenous formation, stability, and efficiency for directed communication networks. Johari et al. (2006) analyze a situation in which bilateral negotiation may result in a contractual agreement between two agents to form a directed link.
3 Non-excludability means that no one can be effectively excluded from using the resource. 4 Examples also include flows of polluted water between plots of an irrigated perimeter. When a farmer makes an effort to reduce his use of chemicals and fertilizers, his downstream successors benefit. Rivers and families are other examples of natural directed networks, determined respectively by geological and biological factors. In all these settings, natural flows and structures can influence the incentive to
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The directed feature of natural links between stakeholders of a CPR raises a new set of research questions:
• How does the natural directed structure affect the level and pattern of CPR conservation?
• How do the pattern of directed links shape the efforts that stakeholders exert and the payoff they can hope to earn?
• How do new directed links -links between cities for example -affect contributions and welfare?
Herein, these questions are addressed by extending the model developed by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) . There is a fixed natural structure that is directed. Stakeholders manage a CPR -wetlands -that is costly to conserve. This CPR is non-excludable among naturally linked stakeholders. Stakeholders decide how much to contribute to the conservation of the resource, knowing that the resource is non-excludable in this way. We also analyze data from the Livenne river basin in the Gironde estuary to examine some predictions of the theory.
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Our analysis yields three main insights.
First, directed networks can lead to specialization. In many directed networks, there is an equilibrium in which some stakeholders contribute to the conservation of the resource and others free ride completely. This outcome can have welfare benefits, when free riders are preceded by several contributors.
contribute. 5 Herein, we deliberately look at a complete information setting for one main reason. In the Livenne river basin application that we investigate empirically, word of mouth communication travels much faster than actions, so if a stakeholder behaves badly, other stakeholder hear about it quickly.
Second, not all directed networks lead to specialization. In some directed networks, there is a unique equilibrium in which all stakeholders contribute to the conservation of the resource. This outcome arises when stakeholders are linked in a very specific way.
Finally, having a greater number of directed links is not always better. A new directed link increases access to the CPR, but also reduces individual incentives to contribute.
Hence, overall welfare can be greater even if there are holes in a directed network. This paper contributes to several research areas. that are non-excludable in a geographic or social dimension. More generally, this paper contributes to the extensive literature on the management of the commons initiated by Gordon (1954) and deeply discussed, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, by Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. (2002) . 7 We study the conservation of a CPR embedded in a natural directed network structure. Our innovation is that we add direction to the links.
Second, the paper contributes to the economic theory of networks. We consider a game in which agents perform actions that are substitutes for their predecessors' actions.
We relate the Nash equilibria to two graph-theoretic notions: maximal independent sets 6 See İlkiliç (forthcoming) for a study of the extraction game played on (undirected) networks, where links connect agents (cities) with sources and agents decide how much resource units (water) to draw from each source they are connected to. Herein, we focus on the actual resource system itself, which may be jointly used. See Walker et al. (1990) for more detailed information on this distinction.
7 See Seabright (1993) for a survey of the literature on the management of the commons.
and Hamiltonian cycles. An independent set of a directed graph is a set of agents such that no two agents who belong to the set are adjacent, i.e. there are no links connecting the two. 8 We show that equilibria where some agents contribute and other agents free ride often, but not always, exist and correspond to this structural property of a directed graph. A cycle in a directed graph is a directed sequence of linked agents, in which all arcs are traversed in their prescribed directions and every agent appears at most once, except for the first and the last agents, who coincide. 9 We show that the existence of equilibria where some agents contribute and other agents free ride is closely related to the non-existence of a cycle in directed graphs.
Finally, this paper has common features with the branch of the literature on networks that aims at identifying the effects of individuals' neighborhood patterns on behavior and outcomes. 10 Our analysis suggests that stakeholders who have active predecessors should have high benefits but exert little effort. We also expect stakeholders who have prominent natural positions to bear less of the effort costs, and instead to rely on other stakeholders' efforts. Using data from the Livenne river basin of the Gironde estuary, we examine some results of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model. In Section 3, we study the Nash equilibria of the game. In Section 4, we derive conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria. In Section 5, we study the stable equilibria of the game. In Section 6, we study economic welfare for a given directed graph; 10 We can find applications in many areas of economics. For instance, Bala and Goyal (1998) analyze how the (fixed) structure of neighborhoods in a society effects how information is generated and disseminated. Morris (2000) analyzes a process of behavior contagion in a (fixed) network. Corominas-Bosch (2004) analyzes bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by a (fixed) network. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007) analyze price competition among service providers in a (fixed) congested network.
then, in Section 7, we ask how changing the directed graph structure can affect welfare.
In Section 8, we examine a natural directed network in the Livenne river basin of the Gironde estuary. Section 9 concludes. The proofs are given in the Appendix.
The model
There are n cities and the set of cities is N = {1, ..., n}. There is a CPR (wetlands) that can be jointly used by cities and we note e i ∈ [0, +∞) city i's level of effort to conserve the CPR. We assume that the individual cost of effort can be represented by a twice differentiable cost function c (e). An effort profile of all cities is denoted by e = (e 1 , ..., e n ).
Cities are arranged in a directed network, which we represent as a finite directed graph (digraph) g. We assume that g ij = 1 if city j benefits naturally and directly from the results of city i's effort, and g ij = 0 otherwise. Due to the fact that links between cities are directed, g ij ̸ = g ji . Given that city i knows the results of her own effort, we set g ii = 1.
Thus, the digraph that represents the directed network is formed by a finite set of vertices (the cities) and a finite set of arcs (the directed links) that connect, in an ordered way, some pairs of vertices.
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Let N s i = {j ∈ N \i : g ij = 1} denote the set of cities connected to i that benefit directly from the results of city i's effort, which we call city i's successors. Let N p i = {j ∈ N \i : g ji = 1} denote the set of cities connected to i that do not benefit directly from the results of city i's effort, which we call city i's predecessors. We note d We assume that each city receives benefits from her own and her predecessors' effort.
This means that efforts are supposed to be substitutable. We assume that each city receives benefits according to a twice differentiable strictly concave benefit function b (e)
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that efforts are perfectly substitutable, that cities are homogeneous in that the CPR produces similar benefits to all cities and the costs of effort are identical, and the individual marginal cost of effort is constant and equal to c. A city i's payoff can then be written as follows:
e j denotes the total effort of city i's predecessors. 12 We specify the following game. Given a directed natural structure g, cities simultaneously choose the amount of effort that they will expend (henceforth, effort levels). For a given effort profile e, each city i earns payoffs U i (e; g). We analyze pure strategy Nash equilibria, due to the fact that there are no mixed strategy equilibria because the benefit function is concave and costs are linear. In the following analysis, we study how network structure, in particular its directed characteristic, influences equilibrium effort levels.
12 Note that the model with imperfect substitutability, heterogenous cities, and nonlinear cost of effort should be written as follows:
where λ ∈ [0; 1] is a parameter which denotes the degree of substitutability between efforts. In this game, effort levels are perfectly substitutable. The more effort a city's predecessors exert, the less a city exerts herself. As in the undirected framework, three equilibrium profiles may emerge. There may exist a specialized profile in which every city either exerts the maximum amount of effort 13 or exerts no effort: for every city i ∈ N , either e i = e * or e i = 0. There may exist a distributed profile in which every city exerts a strictly positive effort that is less than the maximum amount of effort: for every city i ∈ N , 0 < e i < e * .
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Equilibrium contributions
Finally, there may exist an hybrid profile that falls between the specialized profile and the distributed profile: for every city i ∈ N , 0 e i e * . The following example illustrates the differences between these different types of Nash equilibria in a directed network. 13 In this case, a city would be called a specialist. See Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) . admits an hybrid Nash equilibrium given by the profile e = (0, e * /2, e * /2, e * /2).
The existence of Nash equilibria
We now derive conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in a directed network.
We first focus on the existence of distributed equilibria. Then, we analyze specialized equilibria.
Distributed equilibria
Firstly, we identify an important characteristic of digraphs that do not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium. Then, we point out important digraphs in which we are able to count the distributed equilibria, using concepts from graph theory: the path, the cycle and the Hamiltonian digraph.
A path in a digraph is a directed sequence of vertices linked between each other by arcs. A path is simple if every vertex appears at most once and it is closed if its last vertex is also its first vertex. A cycle in a digraph is a simple closed path: it is a directed sequence of vertices linked between each other by arcs, in which every vertex appears at most once, except for the first and the last vertices, which coincide. A sequence of vertices 14 In numerous digraphs, there exists one or several agents whose in-degree is identical and equal to one. The case of a digraph containing a cycle is a natural example. Nevertheless, in a directed network, at least one of these agents may be connected to another agent outside the cycle without affecting the presence of the cycle within the digraph.
In order to ensure the presence of a distributed Nash equilibrium in such a digraph, the direction of the connection outside the cycle is crucial. We then get the following property.
Lemma 1. If a directed network g contains at least one agent that does not possess any predecessor, then g does not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium.
Proof. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
Lemma 1 entails that there are a lot of digraphs that do not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium. Note also that a digraph that does not contain a cycle contains at least one agent who does not possess any predecessor. This well-known result from graph theory allow us to state that if a directed network does not contain any cycle, the network does not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium. The following example illustrates the concepts of cycle and in-degree of an agent, as long as their connection with the existence of distributed equilibria.
e*/2 e*/2 e*/2 e*/3 e*/3 e*/3 e*-k k e*-k e*/2 e*/2 2e*/3 2e*/3 e*-k k digraph shown in (a) admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium given by the profile e = (e * /2, e * /2, e * /2, e * /2, e * /2). Note that in this network, for every city i ∈ N ,
The digraph shown in (b) admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium given by the profile e = (e * /3, e * /3, e * /3, 2e * /3, 2e * /3). Note that in this network, there exists one city i ∈ N such that d
The digraph shown in (c) admits a continuum of distributed Nash equilibria given by the profile e = (k, e * − k, k, e * − k, k) and two specialized Nash equilibria (when k = 0 or e * ).
Note that in this network, the individual in-degree is equal to one for every city.
We remark that the existence of a distributed Nash equilibrium within a directed 12 network depends closely on the individual in-degree of agents, which should generally be equal to one, except for some specific cases, as shown in Figure ( 2) case (b). Suppose that a digraph verifies this condition for in-degree equality. We can then see that the number of distributed Nash equilibria within such a directed network is characterized by the following property.
by an even number of agents, then g admits a continuum of distributed Nash equilibria.
If g does not contain any cycle formed by an even number of agents, then g admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium.
The following example illustrates the connection between the number of agents within the cycle of a directed network that admits (at least) one distributed Nash equilibrium and the number of distributed equilibria. 
Specialized equilibria
We now derive conditions under which a directed network admits at least one specialized Nash equilibrium. We first identify an important characteristic of digraphs that do not admit any specialized equilibrium. Then, we identify a common property of all the digraphs that admit at least one specialized Nash equilibrium. Given that efforts are substitutable only in a unilateral way, we note that a specialized Nash equilibrium is characterized by the fact that a free rider must always be preceded by at least one specialist. We then obtain, for a specific group of digraphs, the following property.
Lemma 3. If a digraph g contains a cycle Γ formed by an odd number of agents where
We then use a concept from graph theory: the maximal independent set. An independent set I of a digraph g is a set of vertices, no two of which are adjacent, i.e. ∀i, j ∈ I,
). An independent set of a digraph g is maximal if and only if adding every vertex to I makes the set not independent. Thus, given a maximal independent set I, every agent i ∈ N belongs to I or is connected to an agent who belongs to I. The population of agents can then be divided in two distinct sets of agents: those belonging to the maximal independent set I and those belonging to an agent who belongs to I.
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In so far as a single vertex can constitute a maximal independent set, every digraph g contains at least a maximal independent set. The presence of such a set is a necessary condition for the presence of a specialized Nash equilibrium within a directed network;
but it not sufficient. Consider the case of a Hamiltonian digraph formed by five agents that does not contain another cycle. In such a network, there exist several maximal independent sets, each of which is formed by two agents. This digraph does not admit a specialized Nash equilibrium because, for every maximal independent set, there exists an agent who does not possess a predecessor that belongs to the maximal independent set.
It follows that the existence of at least one specialized Nash equilibrium within a directed network is characterized by the following structural property of a digraph.
Proposition 1. A directed network g admits one specialized Nash equilibrium if and
only if g contains a maximal independent set I such that ∀i / ∈ I, ∃j ∈ I such that g ji = 1.
Proposition 1 entails that there exist few digraphs that do not admit a specialized Nash equilibrium. The following example illustrates the concepts of maximal independent set and neighborhood, as long as their connection with the existence of specialized Nash equilibria. 
The selection of Nash equilibria
For numerous digraphs, there exists a variety of equilibrium situations. In particular, a digraph may admit several types of Nash equilibria (distributed, specialized and/or hybrid), so it is relevant to determine which type of equilibrium is the most likely to obtain. In such a situation of multiple equilibria, we can try to reduce the number of equilibria by using a selection criterion founded on a notion of stability based on Nash Lemma 4 entails that a lot of distributed Nash equilibria are unstable. However, this
property cannot be generalized to every distributed equilibria. 19 The following example illustrates the instability of equilibria admitted by a Hamiltonian digraph that does not contain any other cycle, i.e. such that ∀i ∈ N , d
k+ε e*-k k+ε e*-k k+ε e*-k k+ε e*-k-ε
e*-k k e*-k-ε k e*-k-ε k+ε e*-k-ε k+ε 18 Another way to test the stability of Nash equilibria would be to make the degree of substitutability varying at equilibrium. This could be a less restrictive criterion and it might be that some equilibria that appear unstable in the sense of Nash tâtonnement would be stable. This point is left for further research.
19 Consider a digraph composed by two directed triangles linked by a common vertex, as shown by Figure ( 2), case (b). This digraph admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium that is stable.
four cities that does not contain another cycle. We know from Lemma 2 that such a digraph admits a continuum of distributed Nash equilibria. We also know from Proposition 1 that such a digraph admits (at least) one specialized Nash equilibrium. If we introduce a perturbation ε into this directed network, the perturbation never disappears and makes all cities modify their equilibrium choices.
We have seen that every digraph containing a cycle in which every agent possesses only one predecessor, i.e. his predecessor within the cycle, does not admit any stable equilibrium. Consider a specialized Nash equilibrium admitted by a digraph that contains a cycle. Following the introduction of a perturbation ε, every free rider should exert an effort level equal to 0 + ε, and every specialist should exert an effort level equal to e * − ε.
If a free rider i in the cycle possesses two predecessors, at least one of these predecessors is a specialist; otherwise, Proposition 1 tells us that the digraph does not admit any specialized equilibrium. If i's second predecessor is also a specialist, thenē i = 2e * − 2ε; thus agent i's best response is still e i = 0. If i's second predecessor is not a specialist, then e i = e * ; thus agent i's best response is still e i = 0. It is equivalent if agent i possesses more than two predecessors because at least one of these predecessors is a specialist. We then get the following property.
Proposition 2. A specialized Nash equilibrium admitted by a directed network g is stable if and only if, for every cycle contained in g, there exists at least one free rider i
Proposition 2 says that a lot of specialized equilibria are stable, but we know from Lemma 4 that this is not the case for all specialized equilibria. Consider the case of a Hamiltonian digraph formed by four agents and that does not contain any other cycle.
This digraph admits two specialized Nash equilibria that are not stable, as shown in Figure   ( 4). Suppose that a new directed link is created between the free riders. A perturbation introduced in the network will disappear because the best response of the agent who possesses two predecessors will always be to exert no effort. This example illustrates the positive effect of new arcs on the stability of specialized equilibria.
Welfare analysis
We now evaluate the welfare yielded by different allocations of effort within a directed network. The social value of the networks is measured by a social welfare function that corresponds to the sum of each individual payoff. Formally, the social welfare function of profile e for a digraph g can be written as follows:
where it will be remembered thatē i corresponds to the total effort of city i's set of predecessors.
Efficient allocations
We say that a profile e is efficient for a given directed network g if and only if there does not exist another profile e' such that W (e'; g) > W (e; g). In so far as the welfare function is concave, an efficient profile, for every city i such that e i > 0, must verify ∂W (e; g)/∂e i = 0; i.e. for all e i > 0:
where the left hand side corresponds to the marginal social benefit that is derived from city i's effort. We note thatē j corresponds to the sum of the efforts of city j's set of predecessors. Note also that agent j belongs to city i's set of successors. Condition (1) implies that the two cities both exert effort e, such that b ′ (2e) + 3b ′ (e) = c.
The unique Nash equilibrium admitted by this digraph is different from this allocation.
In the equilibrium allocation shown in (b), the city who belongs to the quadrangle and is connected to the triangle exerts no effort. Thus, effort e * should be exerted by two of the three successors of this city.
The best Nash equilibrium
Even though no Nash equilibrium that is admitted by a directed network is efficient, we propose to investigate which equilibria yield the highest welfare. Remember that in equilibrium, each city receives benefits from an effort level at least equal to e * . Thus, nb (e * ) represents the minimum aggregate benefit of each equilibrium profile. However, there exist some equilibria in which some cities exert no effort but are preceded by several specialists. Thus, these cities earn more than b (e * ). The increase in welfare yielded by their benefits is equal to
where the sum concerns every city that exerts no effort. The welfare of an equilibrium can thus be written as follows:
where the second term corresponds to the benefit premium that may arise when the total effort of the predecessors of a city exceeds e * .
Distributed equilibria do not produce benefit premia, while specialized equilibria and hybrid equilibria may produce such a premium. In Equation (2), we see a trade-off between benefit premia and effort costs. It might then be that sometimes, when a digraph admits both a distributed Nash equilibrium and another type of Nash equilibrium (specialized or hybrid), the distributed equilibrium would not be preferable in terms of welfare. We illustrate the emergence of benefit premia within a digraph in the following example. (7) shows two digraphs. The digraph shown in (a) admits a unique hybrid Nash equilibrium. According to Equation (2), the welfare produced by this equilibrium is equal to
The term between brackets corresponds to the benefit premium produced by this hybrid Nash equilibrium, which benefits the city outside the cycle. The digraph shown in (b) admits two specialized Nash equilibria and a continuum of hybrid Nash equilibria. Consider first the specialized equilibrium where k = e * . The welfare of this equilibrium is equal to 5b (e
The term between brackets corresponds to the benefit premium produced by this specialized Nash equilibrium, which benefits the city outside the cycle. Consider now the hybrid equilibrium where k = e * /2. The welfare of this equilibrium is equal to 5b (e
The term between brackets corresponds to the benefit premium produced by this hybrid Nash equilibrium, which benefits the city outside the cycle. We note that, in terms of welfare, the specialized equilibrium where k = e * produces the highest benefit premium and is thus preferable to any other Nash equilibria admitted by this digraph.
The effects of new directed links
In the preceding section, we identified the Nash equilibria of a directed network that yield the highest aggregate welfare. We now analyze the effects on welfare of changes within the digraph itself. We examine the effects in term of welfare of adding a new arc within a given digraph.
We consider changes that appear in the set of Nash equilibria when a new directed link is created. We say that an equilibrium profile e is a second-best equilibrium for a given digraph g if and only if there does not exist any other equilibrium profile e' such that W (e'; g) > W (e; g). We consider a digraph g and two agents i and j who are not connected in g. We denote by g + ij the digraph obtained by connecting i towards j in g. We consider that the directed link induces a loss in welfare when the level of welfare of the second-best equilibrium for digraph g + ij is lower than that for g. We illustrate the positive and negative effects of a new directed link in the following example. 7). This figure shows the unique second-best equilibrium admitted by this directed network. In this case, the overall welfare is equal to 7b (e * )−2ce * .
If we create a new directed link from the specialist of the triangle towards the specialist of the quadrangle, as shown by case (b) in Figure (7) , the initial equilibrium is modified.
This new directed link modifies the overall welfare by decreasing it, since it takes the value of 7b (e * ) − 3ce * . On the other hand, if we create a new directed link between the specialist of the triangle and a free rider of the quadrangle, as shown by case (c) in Figure (7) , the initial equilibrium is not modified. However, the overall welfare increases because it now becomes equal to b (2e * ) + 6b (e * ) − 2ce * . In this case, a free rider has two predecessors who are specialists. The welfare of this city increases because the total effort of her predecessors is now equal to 2e * .
Numerical example
Environmental applications in network analysis are just beginning to appear, and so From Figure 8 , we can draw any random representation of the Livenne directed network.
We use the software program Pajek 20 to achieve this (see Figure 9 ).
We then calculate the in-degree and out-degree indices for every city of the network.
These results are reported in Table 1 . Nine cities have an in-degree equal to zero. This means that these cities have no predecessor. Applying Lemma 1 to this context, we know that the Livenne directed network does not admit any distributed equilibrium. It is interesting to note that only two cities have an out-degree equal to zero. This means that only two cities have no successor. We also note that a large majority of cities has 20 http://pajek.imfm.si/doku.php Figure 9 : Random draw of the Livenne directed network an out-degree equal to one. The city with the highest out-degree, Reignac, also has the highest in-degree. All flows are directed except for three, which are two-way. There are several paths in the network, and one cycle.
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The Livenne directed network admits two specialized equilibria and a continuum of hybrid equilibria. Nevertheless, only two cities, Braud-et-Saint-Louis and Saint-Cierssur-Gironde, could exert different equilibrium effort. Moreover, eight cities have a unique best-response, which is to free ride. According to Proposition 2, there are Nash equilibria that are stable. We also note that five cities would get a benefit premium, according to their position in the network. It is interesting to note that the city with the highest in-degree and out-degree would get the highest benefit premium. However, a majority of cities (15) would exert maximal effort without getting any premium.
21 Saugon -Générac -Campugnan -Reignac -Saugon. 
Conclusion
We have presented a model of CPR conservation in a directed network. In this model, there is a fixed natural structure that connects stakeholders, and stakeholders choose how much to contribute to the conservation of the CPR, which is non-excludable and can be jointly used. The game is noncooperative, i.e. actions are strategic substitutes. This theoretical work was motivated by a desire to understand the conservation of wetlands in a river basin of the Gironde estuary, where stakeholders (cities) are connected by flows of hydrological influence. Due to the fact that these flows are almost always one-way, our model was also motivated by a desire to understand directed networks.
By adding a direction to the links, our model extends the local public goods game played on networks that is developed in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) . We find two fundamental differences between our model and that of Bramoullé and Kranton. First, those authors show that every undirected network admits a specialized equilibrium, while our model shows that many, but not all, directed networks admit a specialized equilibrium.
Second, while those authors show that no distributed equilibrium is stable, our model
shows that some directed networks admit a distributed equilibrium that is stable. In contrast, the welfare analysis reveals three main similarities with the undirected framework.
First, we find that no Nash equilibrium is efficient. Second, we find that benefit premia may appear in directed networks in which free riders are preceded by many contributors.
Finally, we show that structural holes in directed networks may sometimes be beneficial to society as a whole.
A useful direction for further research would be to investigate how the nature of links affects behavior and outcomes. In this regard, the effect of weak ties in comparison with strong ties was first pointed out by Granovetter (1973) . In the example of wetlands that we used when developing our model, it is very clear that flows of hydrological influence vary in their intensity. This fact suggests to study weighted directed networks, which may provide more precise results concerning the existence of Nash equilibria. A further issue for investigation, which is related to the first, is how flows vary over time in addition to varying in their intensity. Finally, it would also be pertinent to examine outcomes if it is assumed that effort substitutability is imperfect and heterogenous among stakeholders because this could provide a more intuitive approach for testing the stability of Nash equilibria. Suppose now that g contains a cycle Γ in which there exists (at least) an agent j ⊂ Γ who represents the initial extremity of one (or several) path, i.e. ∃j ∈ N such that
Thus, agent j has (at least) two successors. Every successor of agent j outside the cycle will choose to exert an effort level identical to the successor of agent j within the cycle (because under our initial assumption, every agent has only one predecessor).
Thus, whatever the size and the number of paths connected to Γ, the number of equilibria admitted by g depends only on the number of agents that belong to Γ.
Proof of Lemma 3. Lemma 2 tells us that if a directed network g verifying the assumption ∀i ∈ N , d − i = 1, contains a cycle composed of an odd number of agents, then the unique Nash equilibrium admitted by g is a distributed Nash equilibrium in which ∀i ∈ N , e i = e * /2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that a specialized profile e is a Nash equilibrium of a directed network g. Thus, for every agent i and j belonging to the set of specialists I e , e i = e j = e * . This implies that g ij = g ji = 0, because otherwise, e * is not their best response. Thus I e is an independent set.
Consider an independent set of specialists I e that is not maximal. By definition, there exists a set of agents J ∈ N such that J ∪ I e is independent. However, ∀j ∈ J, e j = 0 cannot be a best response because agent j is not preceded by one (or several) specialists.
Thus I e is a maximal independent set.
Suppose now that ∀j ∈ I e , ∃i / ∈ I e , such that g ji = 0. As agent i is not preceded by one (or several) specialist, e i = 0 is not her best response. On the other hand, if ∀i / ∈ I e , ∃j ∈ I e , such that g ji = 0, then free riders are all preceded by a specialist and exert their best response.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let g be a digraph containing a cycle Γ in which ∀i ⊂ Γ, d
We consider an equilibrium such that ∀i ⊂ Γ, e i = f i (e) where f i (e) represents the 31 best response of individual i to the profile e. We note f = (f 1 , ..., f n ) the collection of best responses of every agent i belonging to Γ. We define a perturbation ε such that ∀i ∈ N , ε i = ρ where ρ is a small positive number. We introduce the perturbation in the cycle the sequence e (n) will never converge to e.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let g be a digraph that admits a specialized Nash equilibrium.
We first suppose that g does not contain any cycle. Thus, there exists (at least) one
In equilibrium, the best response of agent i is e i = e * .
If we introduce a perturbation ε within the digraph, then the best response of agent i will always be e i = e * . It is the same for every agent who has no predecessor within g.
In addition, ∀h ∈ N d j , i.e. contained in the maximal independent set built from agent
i, e h = e * , etc. The network always admits the initial specialized equilibrium and the sequence e (n) will always converge to e. 
